Reliability is a major concern in the design of large disk arrays. Hellerstein et al. pioneered the study of erasure-resilient codes that allow one to reconstruct the original data even in the presence of disk failures. In this paper, we take a set systems view of the problem of constructing erasure-resilient codes. This leads to interesting extremal problems in nite set theory. Solutions to some of these problems are characterized by well-known combinatorial designs. In other instances, combinatorial designs are shown to give asymptotically exact solutions to these problems. As a result, we improve, extend and generalize previous results of Hellerstein et al.
Introduction
Over the last decade, there has been a sustained exponential advance in the density and performance of semiconductor technology. With this progress came faster microprocessors as well as larger and faster primary memory devices. Improvements in secondary storage systems, on the other hand, have not kept pace. While the performance of RISC microprocessors has been increasing by more than 50% per year 25], disk transfer rates, which depend on the speed of mechanical movements and magnetic media densities, have only improved by about 20% each year 6] . This phenomenon has transformed many computationally-bound applications to being I/O-bound. Indeed, Amdahl 3] already predicted about three decades ago that unless accompanied by corresponding increases in secondary storage performance, big increases in microprocessor performance can only bring about marginal improvements in overall system performance. This disparity has led to the consideration of parallelism as a means to speed up secondary storage systems. Several ideas have been proposed as to how parallelism can be exploited. The most important and successful is the disk array architecture.
The disk array architecture organizes many independent small disks into one large logical disk, as illustrated in Figure 1 . Small disks are preferable to large ones because they have a lower cost and consume less power. For improved performance, disk arrays employ the concept of data striping 31] , which spreads data to multiple disks. This allows both single and multiple I/O requests to be processed in parallel by separate disks, thus improving e ective transfer rates. A further advantage of disk striping is uniform load balance. The more disks we have in a disk array, the higher the performance we obtain. Unfortunately, large disk arrays have low reliability. Failures in disk arrays are often assumed to satisfy the memoryless property, that is, the life expectancy of a disk is dependent only upon the condition that the disk is working now. Under this assumption, the reliability of a disk array is modeled by the exponential distribution 13]. As a consequence, for low disk failure rates, the failure rate of a disk array is directly proportional to the number of disks it contains. Many applications, notably database and transaction processing systems, require both high throughput and high data availability of their storage systems. The most demanding of these applications require continuous operation, which in terms of a storage system requires (i) the ability to satisfy all requests for data even in the presence of disk failures, and (ii) the ability to reconstruct the content of a failed disk onto a replacement disk, thereby restoring itself to a fault-free state. These requirements strongly encourage the introduction of redundancy to tolerate disk failures. Disk arrays which incorporate redundancy have come to be known as Redundant Arrays of Inexpensive Disks (RAID).
There are three primary types of disk failures. The rst, called transient errors, arise from noise corruption and are dealt with by repeating the requests. The second, called media defects, are caused by permanent defects in material, and are detected and masked by the manufacturer. The last are catastrophic failures, such as head crashes and failures of the disk controller electronics. When a disk su ers a catastrophic failure, its data is rendered unreadable, and is e ectively erased.
We therefore call such a disk failure an erasure. For convenience, we also call a set of k disk failures a k-erasure. Error-correcting codes can be used to tolerate erasures. However, components in disk arrays allow us to determine exactly where erasures have occurred. It is possible to take advantage of this additional information to derive codes that are better than those based on error-correcting codes. Hellerstein et al. 16 ] pioneered the study of erasure-resilient codes for large disk arrays. Earlier, Rabin 26] had investigated erasure-resilient codes for information dispersal, but his codes are not particularly suited for disk array applications. Very recently, Alon et al. 2] have also studied erasure-resilient codes to combat bursty losses in packet-switched networks. The parameters of interest there are also di erent from those for disk arrays.
In this paper, we address the problem of designing erasure-resilient codes for large disk arrays along the theme of 16] . By interpreting the coding problem in the context of extremal set theory, we obtain new classes of optimal and asymptotically optimal erasure-resilient codes. These codes improve and extend previous results in the literature. Our treatment also reveals interesting and surprising connections to combinatorial design theory.
Preliminaries
Let x = (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) 2 f0; 1g n . The weight of x, denoted wt(x), is the number P n i=1 x i . The support of x, denoted supp(x), is the set fi j x i = 1g.
A data stripe, or simply stripe, is the minimum amount of contiguous user data allocated to one disk before any data is allocated to any other disk. The size of a stripe must be an integral number of sectors, and is often the minimum unit of update used by system software. Because of this, we can view each disk as a collection of (disjoint) stripes.
De nition 2.1 An n; c; k]-erasure-resilient code, or brie y an n; c; k]-ERC, consists of an encoding algorithm E and a decoding algorithm D with the following properties. Given an n-tuple S of stripes, E produces an (n + c)-tuple E(S) = (E 1 (S); : : : ; E n+c (S)) of stripes, called a codeword, such that for any I f1; : : : ; ng, where jIj = n + c ? k, the decoding algorithm D is able to recover S from (I; fE i (S) j i 2 Ig).
We often call an n; c; k]-ERC a k-ERC when the parameters n and c are not important in the context. To see the relevance of an n; c; k]-ERC to the protection of data loss in a RAID, suppose that we have a piece of data which is partitioned into an n-tuple S of stripes. Given an n; c; k]-ERC, we encode S into a codeword (E 1 (S); : : : ; E n+c (S)), and for 1 i n + c, store E i (S) on disk i of a disk array with n + c disks. The de nition of an n; c; k]-ERC ensures that we can reconstruct the original data in the presence of up to k erasures.
For performance reasons, the erasure-resilient codes we study throughout this paper are assumed to satisfy the following two conditions, as in 16].
(i) We restrict ourselves to systematic codes. An n; c; k]-ERC is systematic if E i (S) = S i , for 1 i n, where S = (S 1 ; : : : ; S n ). The stripes E i (S), for n < i n + c, are called checks. This means that the encoding function leaves the data unmodi ed on some disks. This property is desirable to avoid read penalties associated with decoding when there are no disk failures.
(ii) We restrict ourselves to linear codes over the eld F 2 L , where L is the bit-size of a stripe. In this case, we interpret a stripe as an L-dimensional vector over F 2 , and E is a linear function.
Hence, computations used to encode a stripe are restricted to component-wise modulo two arithmetic, that is, the parity operation . This restriction ensures that encodings and manipulations can be performed e ciently.
Restriction (i) above allows us to separate disks into information disks, which contain the original data, and check disks, which contain the checks. In fact, restrictions (i) and (ii) imply that an n; c; k]-ERC can be described in terms of a c (n + c) matrix H = C j I] over F 2 , where I is the c c identity matrix and C is a c n matrix that determines the equations for the checks. This is a well-known result in the theory of error-correcting codes 18]. The matrix H is called the parity-check matrix of the code. Given the parity-check matrix H = C j I] of a k-ERC, we can think of the rows of C (as well as the rows and columns of I) as being indexed by the check disks of a disk array, and the columns of C as being indexed by the information disks. The content of check disk i is the modulo two sum of the content of those information disks, whose columns they index in C have a one in row i.
The following are some metrics of an erasure-resilient code that are important for disk arrays.
Check disk overhead: This is the ratio of the number of check disks to information disks. An n; c; k]-ERC has a check disk overhead of c=n.
Update penalty: This is the number of check disks whose content must be changed when an update is made in the content of a given information disk. We call these disks the disks associated with the information disk. If m check disks need to be involved in every write, then the parallelism of the disk array is reduced by a factor of m + 1. Since parallelism is the reason behind using disk arrays, update penalties should be kept as small as possible. The update penalties of an erasure-resilient code with parity-check matrix H = C j I] are the column sums of C.
Group size: This is the number of disks that must be accessed during the reconstruction of a single failed disk. The cost of reconstruction makes small group size desirable, while for load balancing reasons, uniform group size is desirable. The group sizes of an erasure-resilient code are the row sums of its parity-check matrix.
Since updates of data are usually much more frequent than the reconstruction of data due to erasures, the update penalties are typically of more concern than the group sizes.
Properties of Parity-Check Matrices
Suppose H = C j I] has a set of k or fewer linearly dependent columns (over F 2 ). The failure of the corresponding disks makes reconstruction of data impossible. In fact, this is the only situation in which disk failures are irrecoverable. It follows that H is the parity-check matrix of a k-ERC if and only if every set of k columns of H contains no nonempty set of linearly dependent columns. Precisely the same condition determines when H is the parity-check matrix of a k-error-detecting code This equivalence between k-ERC and k-error-detecting codes means that results on errordetecting codes can be brought to bear. However, the study of codes for error detection has not focused on the metrics discussed in the previous section. Indeed, as observed in 16], many of these codes are not suitable for disk array applications because they have large update penalties. If an erasure-resilient code is able to tolerate all k-erasures, then every update must a ect the content of at least k + 1 disks (one information disk and k check disks). Thus, the update penalties of a k-ERC are at least k. In view of the importance of minimizing update penalties, we consider from here on only those k-ERC for which the update penalties are all equal to k, the minimum possible. We speak, therefore, of the update penalty, instead of the update penalties of an erasureresilient code. The corresponding parity-check matrix H = C j I] has column sums for C all equal to k. With this in mind, we extend De nition 2.1 to encompass this notion of higher resilience.
De nition 3.5 An n; c; k; l]-ERC is an n; c; k]-ERC which can tolerate all t-erasures, for k+1 t l, except for bad t-erasures.
An alternative view of an n; c; k; l]-ERC is that it is an erasure-resilient code with update penalty k that is able to tolerate all t-erasures, t l, except bad ones. We often write (k; l)-ERC for n; c; k; l]-ERC when the parameters n and c are not important in the context. Requirements for higher reliability of disk arrays make (k; l)-ERC attractive. A (k; k)-ERC is simply a k-ERC. Corollary Before we leave this section, let us make the following de nition.
De nition 3.7 Given c, k, and l, de ne F(c; k; l) to be the maximum n such that there exists an n; c; k; l]-ERC. The maximum number of information disks that can be supported by c check disks is F(c; k; l), if one desires an update penalty of k and wants to tolerate all t-erasures, t l, except bad ones. The important problem is: For given k and l, determine the behavior of F(c; k; l) with respect to c; and construct n; c; k; l]-ERC having n as close to F(c; k; l) as possible. An n; c; k; l]-ERC with n = F(c; k; l) is said to have optimal check disk overhead. We also abbreviate F(c; k; k) to F(c; k).
T uran-Type Problems
If X is a nite set, we denote by . In this case, we also call (Y; B) a forbidden con guration of (X; A).
The symmetric di erence of two sets A and B is denoted A B.
A T uran-type problem takes the form: Given a family F of con gurations, determine the maximum number of blocks in a (k-uniform) set system of order n that avoids all the con gurations in F. We now explain the role of T uran-type problems in the design of erasure-resilient codes.
Given any matrix M 2 f0; 1g m n , one can de ne a set system (X; A), where X = f1; : : : ; mg and A contains precisely the supports of the columns of M. We call (X; A) the set system of M.
Let H = C j I] be the parity-check matrix of an erasure-resilient code. We also call the set system of C the set system of the erasure-resilient code. If (X; A) is the set system of an n; c; k; l]-ERC, then with our foregoing discussion, (X; A) is k-uniform, jXj = c, and jAj = n. Therefore, the check disk overhead is jXj=jAj, and the group sizes are one more than the replication numbers. This correspondence between set systems and parity-check matrices gives rise to T uran-type problems in erasure-resilient codes. Lemma 4.2 (X; A) is the set system of a (k; l)-ERC if and only if for any 2 t l, there do not exist t blocks A 1 ; : : : ; A t 2 A such that j t i=1 A i j l ? t.
Proof: Translate Lemma 3.6 into the language of set systems and observe that supp(u v) = supp(u) supp(v) for any two vectors u; v 2 f0; 1g n .
It follows that the construction of a (k; l)-ERC with optimal check disk overhead is precisely the T uran-type problem of determining the maximum number of blocks in a set system satisfying the condition of Lemma 4.2.
When considering (k; l)-ERC, we may assume l 2k ? 1 for the following reason. Let (X; A) be the set system of a (k; l)-ERC. If the scheme where the content of each information disk is replicated on k di erent check disks. This scheme is able to tolerate all t-erasures, for any t, except for bad ones. For xed update penalty, this scheme has the highest reliability, but su ers from a huge check disk overhead of k. Henceforth, we restrict our attention to k l 2k ? 1. In the next section, we give a general construction for (k; l)-ERC and establish a limit on how good a (k; l)-ERC can be.
Expander-Based Construction and An Upper Bound
Given a set system (X; A), one can construct a bipartite graph G = (X A; E) as follows. The vertex sets of the bipartition are X and A. Two vertices x 2 X and A 2 A are incident if and only if x 2 A. This graph is called the point-block incidence graph of (X; A). The set system (X; A) can be reconstructed from its point-block incidence graph. Let E t denote the event that a subset of t vertices from V has fewer than s = (t(k ?1)+l+1)=2 neighbors in U. Fix The probability that the bipartite graph fails to satisfy (ii) is at most P l t=2 Pr E t ], which can be made to be less than one for n large enough by an appropriate choice of d. The desired result follows.
Next, we establish an upper bound on F(c; k; l). First, let us recall some de nitions from design theory.
De nition 5.3 A t-(v; k; 1) packing is a k-uniform set system, (X; A), of order v, such that every t-subset of X is contained in at most one block of A. De nition 5.4 A t-(v; k; 1) design is a k-uniform set system, (X; A), of order v, such that every t-subset of X is contained in precisely one block of A. to an irrecoverable k-erasure.
The exponent in the upper bound of Corollary 5.6 is about twice that for the lower bound. We believe the upper bound to be the true asymptotic behavior of F(c; k; l), but tightening the lower bound in general appears di cult. In Sections 6 and 7, we give exact and asymptotically exact bounds for several cases when k is small. We can improve on Lemma 6.2 by examining the set system of a (3; 4)-ERC. The only 3-uniform con gurations (Y; B), 2 jBj 4, for which j B2B Bj 4 ? t, are those shown in Figure 2 . By Lemma 4.2, these con gurations must be avoided by the set system of any (3; 4)-ERC.
Forbidding P 1 from the set system (X; A) of an n; c; 3; 4]-ERC is equivalent to saying that (X; A) is a 2-(c; 3; 1) packing. The con guration P 2 is known in the design theory literature under various names: quadrilateral, Pasch con guration, fragment, or arrow (see 9]). A 2-(v; 3; 1) packing that does not contain a Pasch con guration is called anti-Pasch or quadrilateral-free (QF). The construction of (3; 4)-ERC with optimal check disk overhead is therefore equivalent to the following problem. Proof. Follows from Theorem 6.6 and Lemma 6.4.
We now turn our attention to (3; 5)-ERC. It turns out that there are no con gurations in addition to P 1 and P 2 which need to be avoided by the set system of a (3; 5)-ERC. Consequently, every (3; 4)-ERC is also a (3; 5)-ERC. Lemma 4.2 implies that for (X; A) to be the set system of an n; c; 4]-ERC, it is necessary and su cient to avoid the ve con gurations in Here, we address the more di cult problem of constructing (4; 5)-ERC, and in the process, obtain asymptotically exact bounds on both F(c; 4) and F(c; 4; 5) . A short computation demonstrates that in order for (X; A) to be the set system of an n; c; 4; 5]-ERC, it is necessary and su cient to avoid Q i , 1 i 5, and the nine con gurations shown in Figure 4 . The remainder of this section describes a nite eld construction for (4; 5)-ERC.
De nition 7.1 A set system (X; A) is k-partite if there is a partition of X into k parts, X = X 1 X k , such that for every block A 2 A, we have jA \ X i j 1, for 1 i k.
One idea we use to simplify our construction is to restrict our attention to set systems of (4; 5)-ERC that are 4-partite. It is known 11] that for every k-uniform set system (X; A), one can nd a k-partite set system (X; B), where B A, such that jBj k! k k jAj. So our restriction to 4-partite set systems is not a severe one, and a ects F(c; 4; l) by at most a constant factor of 32=3. The con gurations Q i , i 2 f2; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10; 11; 12; 13; 14g, are not 4-partite. Hence, they are avoided by any 4-partite set system. It therefore su ces to construct 4-partite set systems that avoid Q i for i 2 f1; 3; 4; 5g. De nition 7.2 An extension of a set system (X; A) by a point 1 6 2 X is the set system (X f1g; B), where B = fA f1g j A 2 Ag.
We now describe the nite eld construction. Let q be an odd prime power and let ! gives the required result.
The bound on F(c; 4; 5) ), but the largest group remains about twice as big as the smallest. However, the following splitting process can be used to make the group sizes more uniform.
De nition 7.9 Suppose (X; A) is a set system and x 2 X. Let A x = fA 2 A j x 2 Ag and B A x such that jBj = bjA x j=2c. De ne W = X fx 0 g and D = (A n B) f(An fxg) fx 0 g j A 2 Bg. Then (W; D) is the set system obtained by splitting x in (X; A), and is denoted split x (X; A). We can extend this de nition to splitting a subset S X in (X; A) as follows. split S (X; A) = ( split x (X; A); if S = fxg; split Snfxg (split x (X; A)); if x 2 S and jSj 2:
Next, we show that splitting preserves erasure-resilience. This obviates the need to consider many of the con gurations treated for the case when l = 5. The only con gurations that a 2-(c; 4; 1) packing must avoid in order for it to be the set system of a (4; 6)-ERC is Q 14 and Q 16 (shown in Figure 5 ).
De nition 7.12 A transversal design, TD(k; n), is a triple (X; G; B), where X is a set of kn points, G is a partition of X into k parts (called groups), each of size n, and (X; B) is a k-uniform set system such that every 2-subset of X is contained in exactly one group (of G) or one block (of B), but not both.
De nition 7.13 Let (X; G; B) be a TD(k; n). The design obtained by removing a group G 2 G is the triple (X n G; G n fGg; fB n G j B 2 Bg). Then (X; G; B)is a TD(4; q). The set system (X; B) is a 4-partite 2-(4q; 4; 1) packing. Let (X 0 ; G 0 ; B 0 ) be the TD(3; q) obtained by removing the group F q f3g in (X; B; G). Lemma 7.14 The set system (X; B) avoids Q 16 . Proof. Suppose (X; B) contains the con guration:
This con guration has a unique (up to isomorphism) partition of its points into four parts so that each block contains exactly one point from each part. This partition is indicated by di erent shadings in the gure. Hence, the points of one of the parts must belong to F q f3g. Deleting all the points in any part gives the following con guration.
So (X 0 ; B 0 ) must contain the con guration above. There are six possibilities to consider, as shown below. The set system of a (4; 7)-ERC must avoid the four con gurations in Figure 6 in addition to all the forbidden con gurations for set systems of (4; 6)-ERC. Figure 6 . None of the con gurations in Figure 6 is 4-partite. Since (X; B) is 4-partite, these con gurations are all avoided. The replication number of every point in X is q. Proof. Let q be the largest prime power at most c=4. Theorem Proof. Let 
Controlling Group Sizes by Balanced Orderings
Let g 1 ; : : : ; g c be the group sizes of an n; c; k; l]-ERC. Then, P c i=1 g i = kn+c. So the average group size is kn=c + 1. Since the check disk overhead is c=n, the smaller the check disk overhead, the larger the average group size. In the previous sections, our focus has been on the construction of erasure-resilient codes with optimal and asymptotically optimal check disk overheads. Therefore, inevitably, our codes have large average group size. It is, however, possible to trade check disk overhead for a smaller average group size. Given the parity-check matrix C j I] of an erasure-resilient code, one can simply delete the appropriate number of columns of C so that the desired average group size is obtained. However, this process does not guarantee that the maximum group size is lowered. We have indicated in Section 2 that for load balancing reasons, uniform group size is desirable. This raises the issue of whether it is possible to construct erasure-resilient codes in which there is a way of deleting columns from its parity-check matrix so that every group size is close to the average. We now discuss this problem more formally. The terminology we use here generalizes that in 16].
De nition 8.1 Let be a positive integer. An erasure-resilient code is said to have -balanced group size if the following conditions hold:
(i) when the average group size is 1 (mod ), all groups are the same size;
(ii) when the average group size is not 1 (mod ), the maximum group size is at most greater than the minimum group size.
Let M be an m n matrix. The existence of KTS(v) has long been settled 27]; the condition v 3 (mod 6) is both necessary and su cient. Work on the existence problem for anti-Pasch STS(v) is also well under way. However, Problem 8.7 appears not to have been studied, perhaps due to the lack in motivation. This is not the case now. We settle here the existence of anti-Pasch KTS(v) for a third of the admissible values of v. In particular, we prove that there exists an anti-Pasch KTS(v) for all v 9
(mod 18). The proof is somewhat technical and uses more complex design-theoretic machinery than we have required thus far. In order to conserve space, we refer the reader to 4, 7] for de nitions and results in design theory not explicitly stated here.
A group divisible design (GDD) is a triple (X; G; B) which satis es the following properties: (1) G is a partition of a set X (of points) into subsets called groups, (2) B is a set of subsets of X (called blocks) such that a group and a block contain at most one common point, (3) every pair of points from distinct groups occurs in a unique block.
The group-type (type) of the GDD is the multiset jGj : G 2 G]. We usually use an \exponential" notation to describe group-type: a group-type g u 1 1 g us s denotes u i occurrences of g i for 1 i s.
Groups of size 0 are permitted as a notational convenience. The type is uniform when all groups have the same size, in which case the type is of the form g u .
If K is a set of positive integers, each of which is not less than 2, then we say that a GDD (X; G; B) is a K-GDD if jBj 2 K for every block B in B. When K = fkg, we simply write k for K. A balanced incomplete block design BIBD(v; k; 1) is a k-GDD of type 1 v . A transversal design TD(k; n) is a k-GDD of type n k .
We need the following notion of resolvability. A set of blocks is an -parallel class if every point x is contained in exactly blocks. A GDD(X; G; B) is called A-resolvable where A is a multiset of positive integers of r elements and if its block set B admits a partition into subsets B 1 ; B 2 ; : : : ; B r where for each i = 1; 2; : : : ; r, there is an 2 A such that B i is an -parallel class. The case when A = 1 r ] corresponds to the case of the usual notion of resolvability.
A 3-GDD is anti-Pasch, and called a QFGDD, when it contains no Pasch con gurations. In fact, we enforce the stronger condition that there is no way to place a single triple on the points within one group and thereby introduce a Pasch con guration. In e ect, since the Pasch con guration does not have two disjoint blocks, the consequence is that no matter how triples are placed within groups, a Pasch con guration would lie (if at all) entirely on the points of a single group. A TD(3,n) which is a QFGDD is denoted by QFTD(n). It is an easy exercise to see that a QFTD(n) is precisely the same as a latin square of order n which has no subsquare of order two (see 21] for related results).
Direct Constructions
In this subsection, we present some direct constructions of anti-Pasch KTS. Let (x) = x + 3. The design is generated by letting act on the set of blocks. The rst eleven blocks form a parallel class; the action of gives eleven parallel classes. Each of the remaining base blocks generates a parallel class under the action of . Lemma 8.9 There exists an anti-Pasch KTS(39), an anti-Pasch KTS(45), and an anti-Pasch KTS(63). Proof: Let V = Z 39 . Consider f0; 7; 16g, f4; 10; 25g, f1; 6; 18g, f8; 9; 11g f0; 8; 19g, f0; 4; 14g, f2; 15; 28g.
These form the base blocks of an anti-Pasch STS(39) over Z 39 . The 12 points in the rst four base blocks are distinct (mod 13). Adding 13 and 26 to each block and appending the block f2; 15; 28g gives a parallel class. Develop to obtain thirteen parallel classes. Each of the two remaining base blocks generates three parallel classes, as the points in each block are distinct (mod 3).
Similarly, let V = Z 45 . Consider   f0,1,3g, f2,7,13g, f12,19,39g, f5,14,26g, f6,10,23g,  f0,8,31g, f0,10,29g The rst ve blocks contain elements that are all distinct modulo 15, and hence generate 15 parallel classes. The last two blocks each generate three parallel classes, as the points in each block are distinct (mod 3). Finally, the base block f0,15,30g generates a single parallel class.
Let V = Z 63 . Consider   f0,1,3g, f4,8,13g, f6,12,19g, f15,23,39g, f5,17,49g, f16,30 ,52g, f20,35,53g, f0,10,38g, f0,11,34g, f0,17,43g
These generate an anti-Pasch KTS (63) Proof: Delete a point from the anti-Pasch KTS(2v + 1) to form a 3-GDD of type 2 v . Give weight n using a resolvable QFTD(3; n) to produce a 3-GDD of type (2n) v . Add one in nite point 1, and on each group together with 1, place a copy of the QFSTS(2n + 1) so that when f1; a; bg is a triple, a and b arise from di erent points of the 3-GDD of type 2 v . Call the triples of the 3-GDD of type (2n) We have established existence of resolvable QFTD(3,n)s here only when n is odd. Obtaining such TDs when n is even is more involved and not needed for the main result we present, and so we omit it here.
8.2
Rees's Construction
In this section, we employ Rees's construction 28] on resolvable group divisible designs to obtain some new anti-Pasch KTSs.
A partial transversal design PlTD(k; n) is a triple (X; C; B) where X is a kn-set, B is a collection of k-subsets of X (blocks) so that any pair of distinct points from X is contained in at most one block, and C is a strong k-vertex-coloring of X (i.e., each block receives k di erent colors) so that jCj = n for each C 2 C. Any transversal design is a PlTD (just take each group as a color class). Similarly, a partial group divisible design K-PlGD of type T is a triple (X; C; B) where X is a v-set, B is a collection of subsets of C (blocks) each having same size from the set K so that any pair of distinct points from X is contained in at most one block, and C is a strong coloring of X.
A group H of automorphisms on a set V acts sharply transitively on V if for every two elements x; y 2 V , there exists h 2 H so that xh = y where the group action is written as left multiplication.
A block-partition of a transversal design (X; G; B) is a partition P of its block set B; we refer to the members of P as aggregates. If each member of P is a clear set (i.e., composed of mutually disjoint blocks) then we refer to P by the usual term block-coloring. These two constructions are complicated and very powerful. In our case, if we begin with an anti-Pasch GDD, we can in ate to get an anti-Pasch resolvable GDD. The proof of this theorem is lengthy and similar to the proof in 28], so we do not include it here. Brie y, we in ate the GDD so that for every block of size k, we put the TD(k; h) that corresponds to the groups of the k points. Hence, when all blocks have size three, if the TD(u; h) has the extra property that any three groups induce an anti-Pasch TD, then we produce an anti-Pasch GDD. Therefore, it is important to know if such TD(u; h)s exist. We now apply Rees's Theorem. If we replace all ingredients by anti-Pasch KTS, QFGDD and resolvable QFTD, then we can obtain a similar result for the construction of resolvable QFGDD. We need some QFGDDs with few color classes, and can obtain some from Bose's construction. Lemma 8.25 Let n = 6k + 5 and C i = fi; i + 1; i + 2g for i = 0; 1; : : : ; n ? 1, arithmetic over Z n . If C= fC i : i = 0; 1; : : : ; n ? 1g, then for any a; b 2 Z n Cn(C a C b ) can be partitioned into three sets of 2k + 1 blocks so that any two blocks in the same set are disjoint.
Proof: Sort the blocks in increasing order according to smallest element in the block. Then put the j th block in the j (mod 3) set to obtain the required partition. This settles the existence of anti-Pasch KTS(v)s when v 9 (mod 18), along with many of the small orders in the remaining classes. The techniques here do not seem su ciently powerful to handle the cases in which v is a multiple of 3 but not 9. From a practical standpoint, the solution of a single congruence class modulo 18 already provides a rich source of codes.
Conclusion
Disk arrays provide a solution to the disparity in performance between microprocessors and secondary storage systems. There is an increasing popularity in the use of disk arrays. One of the major problems faced by critical applications is the reliability of disk arrays. In this paper, we have provided constructions for erasure-resilient codes that can tolerate failures in disk arrays. Our results improve, extend, and generalize previous results of Hellerstein et al. 16] .
One surprise in this work is the role of combinatorial designs. For example, it is shown that (3; 4)-ERC are equivalent to anti-Pasch Steiner triple systems, which have been studied actively for the past decade by mathematicians without having any particular applications in mind. In exchange, the study of erasure-resilient codes o ers new interesting problems in combinatorial design theory such as the existence of anti-Pasch Kirkman triple systems addressed in this paper.
